2015年1月30日,星期五

Against the 心神/brain by 弗雷德·康明斯

来宾留言 弗雷德·康明斯 回应推文交换。
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这是给格雷格·希科克(Greg Hickok)的一封信,以回应最近的一些推文交流,这些交流似乎立即引发了140个字符片段中无法解决的问题。我包括来自利兹的Andrew Wilson和Sabrina Golonka,以及来自利默里克的Marek McGann,因为我相信我们都可能对所面临的问题有有趣的看法。
Let's start with this heartfelt tweet from Greg, which I hope 代表s common ground among all of us:

我想知道,如果我们能理解彼此之间到底想说什么,科学的步伐会加快多少。 (来源:@GregoryHickok)
I might have some reservations 关于 the use of "pace", which suggests a simple linear progressive course from ignorance into certainty, to be delivered by science, but the sentiment that we are talking past each other, and that this is not in 任何 of our interests, motivates this reply.
然后,为了开始讨论,下面是由Greg触发的三个进一步的推文(连接的)序列,触发了此响应:

Embody: 'To give a concrete form to what is abstract' (OED). In the brain, concrete form = neural codes (firing patterns, etc). An 体现的 mental concept then just means a concept defined by neural codes. Embodied cognition therefore targets the same question as standard cognitive neuroscience: how does the brain code information?
Greg进一步尝试确定两个相对(或互补)的位置:

在两个大阵营中公平地体现化身? “心理”:嵌齿轮以感觉运动为基础。 '物理':齿轮/感应电机接地在身体/环境中
I bristled. I objected. I complained that Greg was misappropriating the word "体现的":

OED a terrible source from which to work here. Your nonce definition demands faith in a 计算的 orthodoxy many reject. (Source: @fcummins)

那我们应该从哪里开始呢? (@GregoryHickok)

By not misappropriating the term "体现的"? CogSci has not been helped by Camp A's dismissal of Camp B (for many As and Bs) (@fcummins)
格雷格答复:

Ok, I'm listening. What is your version of 体现的? (@GregoryHickock)
这是tweet格式出现问题的地方,因为这是一个很大的问题。我也不打算回答这个问题,因为它以实际上不存在的其他共同点为前提。在我们可以有效地找到答案之前,必须承认这种打哈欠的深渊。否则,我们确实无法理解彼此之间听到的他妈的声音。
重要资格:这里没有两个营地,其中一个是格雷格,另一个是安德鲁·萨布丽娜·马雷克·弗雷德。我不代表安德鲁-萨布丽娜-马雷克(Andrew-Sabrina-Marek)发言,这里的观点属于我自己。我不相信他们会得到其他任何人的同意。那(以及我们之间推特交流的良好本性)将使我可能夸大我的案情,以引起人们对缺少的共识的关注,如果情况有所改善,必须承认这些共识。毫无疑问,我也将对格雷格的立场和承诺做出毫无根据的假设,对此我将高兴地接受指责和指责。 而且如果我的语气退化到最后变得不连贯,我会要求保持良好的放纵。 我喜欢第一条推文提出的挑战,并且我认为我们所有人都需要学习如何争论,并适当认识到可以将我们分开的鸿沟。

At issue here is not a disagreement over how we understand the mechanisms of the cognitive system that give rise to human behaviour. It is not a matter of negotiating the degree to which such explanations need to appeal to properties of the non-brain body in addition to the 计算的 properties of the brain. The disagreement is much more serious and fundamental than that.
There is not, nor is there likely to be, agreement that the brain is best understood as a 计算的 machine. Likewise there is no agreement that there *is* a cognitive system. There is no agreement that the physiological activity of the brain is properly understood in 表示al terms. There is no agreement that the brain is the locus, or origin, of phenomenal experience, or consciousness. This is a lot of disagreement. So much, that a premature jump to accounts of what "embodiment" might mean will get nowhere.

我不想说服格雷格(Greg)或整个认知神经科学说服他们的事业根本不健全。我确实认为,对大脑的正统解释以及由​​此产生的人类行为的因果关系是可悲的错误,因此有其他选择是必要的。但这也许是所有争论中最大的骨头:我不认为存在,可能存在或应该存在,最终确定的是一个人是什么,对他们的经历如何发展,或者像是什么样子一个人。我坚信,应就这些问题进行谈判。假定的答案不是无机科学中“事实”的本质,并且永远不会承认在严格性和预测性上可与力学定律相媲美的定律下的归类。

And so the 表示al, 计算的, information processing, cognitivist approach to brains and to people has its place. It is hopelessly wrong, but that is not the problem. The problem is the authority granted to models, findings, pronouncements arising from such views. Science does not give us certainty here. It gives us the means to negotiate and approach local consensus, for some issues, some of the time.

What I do find lamentable is the failure of folk in the 表示al camp (role played by Greg here) to even acknowledge that their position is open to question. To assume that it is OK to appeal to 表示s and information processing and perceptual inputs, and the whole grab bag of psychological concepts that, from where I and many others are standing, appear to be worse than untrustworthy.

情感可能是生命形式的属性,而不是大脑的属性,这是某些崇高精神的明确表述。哲学上的争论至少可以追溯到康德,而最近汤普森的“人生思想”,如乔纳斯(Jonas),胡塞尔(Husserl),瓦雷拉(Varela),曼塔拉娜(Maturana)以及许多其他人一样,提供了充实的解释。这不是一个声音。与生活息息相关的事情到处都是。有关如何理解“生命”问题的生物学哲学方面最重要的进展,都融入到本文的讨论中。特伦斯·迪肯(Terrence Deacon)的《残缺的自然》和斯图尔特·考夫曼(Stuart Kaufmann)的《研究》是一些相关的作品。我可以列举很多其他游戏,但我要建立的就是镇上不止一场游戏,而对理性主义者,认知主义者阵营经常从事的其他人的扎根,有理智的立场的故意疏忽只能说出他们的缺乏领土知识。我们在思想和生活营地中都充分认识到政治家立场的论据,成功,失败,弱点和优点。为什么我们一再陷入该阵营未能承认其他立场的困境?一些创始人以其惊人的傲慢闻名。福多(Fodor)在2001年说:

在我看来,[心理计算理论]是迄今为止我们认为最好的认知理论。’已经确实,我们唯一的’ve got that’s worth the bother of a serious discussion.... its central idea---that intentional processes are syntactic operations defined on mental 表示s---is strikingly elegant.
那句话“我们唯一值得认真讨论的人”使我感到恼火。它是轻蔑和无知的。乔姆斯基以类似的方式定期辩论,最近克里斯蒂娜·贝姆(Christina Behme)公开要求其担任任务。这是等级,无知,原教旨主义。
The 1991 book The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson, Rosch) is a landmark work that introduced some of these concerns into cognitive science. It also 代表s the first principled introduction of the term Embodiment into such fundamental discussions. 期限has been dragged through many ditches since, and used and misused in so many ways that 任何 suggestion that there is an agreed interpretation of the term is ridiculous. To illustrate my point, I need only point out how Greg felt that embodiment could be subsumed within his view of how brains relate to experience and behaviour (I hate the word "心神").
Is it necessary to argue here the shortcomings of the contemporary cognitivist view? Is it necessary to decry it as a crypto-religious solipsistic Cartesian approach, bound inseparably to a cultural-historical view of the human that valorises individual agency and autonomy to the point of shutting the person off from their world? To my jaundiced eye, all 计算的 accounts we currently have fall woefully short of providing plausible accounts of either experience or behaviour. They lean on a magical notion of 表示 that is a theological construct, yet they are not aware of their theological commitments.
所涉问题并不小。它们扩展到多个单词。但是,我希望这种回应可以起到标记作用,从而使格雷格和所有属于认知主义教会的人都不会随意挪用他们甚至不承认的理性认识方法中的用语。我很高兴就以上几点进行详细阐述,但我认为此推文现已达到其字符数限制。

-- 
认知科学专业
UCD计算机科学与信息学院


18条评论:

未知说过...

谁能帮我总结一下康明斯'争论?我了解到,认知主义者的说法从根本上讲是不正确的,是悲剧的/无可救药的错误,是正统的,缺乏知识,苦恼、,昧,无知,原教旨主义,隐秘宗教和纯粹主义,但我没有'不太明白为什么。我在哪里想念事实?

我没有得到的第二个问题是到底是什么问题"representation" (or 计算, or information processing). I thought that in general there is nothing really mysterious 关于 it. There are neurons in the brain that "correlate" with something happening 在那里 in the world. A bee's的神经系统包含当蜂中出现特定种类的花时选择性激发的神经元'的视野。同样,条形和光栅单元"correlate with" or "represent"条和光栅。但是也许我对这些事情过于天真。所以请帮助我,为什么使用该术语会有问题"representation"相关的射击方式?

格雷格希科克说过...

不,这里没有论据。它'一条讲道。我的观点've been trying to make all along is that if you look 引擎盖下 of 体现的 accounts they end up being 计算的.

弗雷德说过...

公平地说(1)这是写给Greg的,不是博客文章,(2)我没有't try to argue against 表示alism. I tried to point out that 表示alists are typically unaware that there are other approaches, and simply insist that all approaches must condone a 计算的 interpretation of the brain. Greg's point that the other approaches reduce to 表示alism illustrates this nicely.

Arguing agains 表示alism requires even more space than we have here. One set of readings designed to introduce such arguments is here: http://postcogtopics.blogspot.ie/p/readings.html.

Computationalists and 表示alists who start of with "What could possibly be wrong with 计算的ism?"根本没有开始做功课。

格雷格希科克说过...

I'我看了机器人学的一些论点,读了一两本书,读了安德鲁和萨布丽娜'的东西,我仍然坚持's 计算的 引擎盖下. 可能be the 体现的 folks who dismiss 计算的 approaches haven't done their homework on what we count as 计算的. As I suggested in my book and in a previous blog post, let's pic an easy problem, say sound localization in the barn owl and see if you can do it without 计算.

威廉·马汀说过...

@莫里茨,

期限"representation"认知科学中所用的用法不同于哲学中的用法。表示形式'由它们如何表示信息来定义"out there"在世界上(这是我所知道的哲学上的传统用法),但是,该术语通常用来表示"mental object". In this sense, a 表示 may have no direct external 相关 to the outside world. The word "dog" would include various mental 表示s including a sequence of abstract phonemes that end up getting converted via a series of intermediary 表示s and 计算s into sound waves; these sound waves may have no direct correlation to the underlying mental 表示s, as Alvin Liberman'1950年代的研究表明(同一音素在不同的发音结构下具有明显不同的声音效果)。

As far as I can tell, 弗雷德 argues that there is some coherent position that denies the existence of mental 表示s and 计算s, defined as 精神对象s and processes. I think such positions are hopelessly irrational, which is probably why cognitivists dismiss them so readily.

诺伯特说过...

我认为格雷格有正确的论证策略。当问题很复杂时,让's start (or 在 least have as guides) a few concrete cases whose details we can point to to anchor our discussions. This is what Greg does so well in his book. Cummins shies away from this, and I think I know why. ONce we get down to details, we will see that the issue is not whether 表示s and 计算s matter, but which ones. This will, however, demystify the "debate,"并非辩论各方都希望的东西。

At least in those areas that I known 任何thing 关于 (language) there really is no 另类 to the 计算的 theory. So, if Cummins has something in 心神, then it would be useful to present an purported explanation or two to fix ideas. Short of this, there can be no useful discussion.

弗雷德说过...

谷仓猫头鹰是一个很好的例子,其中一个"computational"记述显然是一种很好的方式,可以更好地描述神经系统在产生这种行为中的作用。但是这个词"computation"这里的意思是"doing sums", not in the sense of something that gives rise to intentionality, as it is invoked in mainstream 表示al cognitive science. Doing sums is obviously going to be necessary here, and there is no point in arguing over whether 计算 is required here, 任何 more than if we were discussing the modulation of blood pressure in the circulatory system. There, too, we should use sums, and we could even talk of 表示 in a philosophically benign manner as we relate numbers in one part of a network to those elsewhere.

But 在 the heart of 表示al cognitive science is the claim that 计算 and 表示 support our mental claims -- they ground the manner in which we come to know the world, by virtue of generating intentionality of a rather different sort.
One common case trotted out here to demonstrate unequivocal 表示s (neural patterning that is 关于 something in an exterior world) is the retinotopic, tonotopic and somato sensory maps found in primary sensory cortices. These seem to be clearly "about" some part of the body. But the sense in which they are 关于 say the play of light 在 a location on the retina (and by dodgy inference, in the visual field), for example, is a straightforward one or two step topographical mapping. In this way, they are 关于 the world/cns border in the same way that a footprint in the sand is 关于 a stepping event. That kind of "aboutness" is entirely causal and unproblematic. An imprint is 关于 a prior event.

但是像无害的计算意义(我们做了一些总和)一样,这种无用的术语表示不能满足认知神经心理学所要求的许多任务。这种表示需要系统中的某些元素(符号,发射模式,人口代码,伽玛-θ夹带)与外部(非神经)世界的某些特征相关,这要通过在符号系统中发挥作用来实现。引起拓扑映射的直接链接是"black boxed"。我们不能再通过一系列因果转换来遵循从引用到引用表示的路径。这似乎是信仰的文章,是经典认知科学的核心。 (也许格雷格和其他人会说"but we don'订阅该用法!"。很好,但是在Fodorian或Newell中系统中符号的魔术意图&西蒙,感觉总是潜伏着,如果你不这样做't与您保持距离,您将被召唤去完成任务。)(第1部分,共2部分)

弗雷德说过...

因此,让我与另一个例子相反,这一次是从世界语言(或称我们输入的语言不会叫它)开始的。我自己首选的学习对象是联合讲话,这是许多人同时说同一件事的时候(想一想祈祷)。& protest &足球)。在其他地方,我认为这是人类科学家非常感兴趣的现象,并且是一种由于故意造成的目的,不能将其刻划为单个头骨的现象,因为它是集体的。我从这篇文章开始的根本分歧在本质上具有一种心理方法的内在缺陷,该方法只能一次限制一个人的思维。我会坚持认为(但是我们需要更多的空间来适当地执行此操作)*是*对我们科学的神学干预,也是我们最好意识到的问题。从具体的和积极的观点来看,心理不仅限于个人的单一,原子的思想。经历,参与和享受的世界的核心是主体间的。
There are over 9000 articles on the entirely marginal phenomenon of glossolalia. There is an order of magnitude less on joint speech, yet this is a ubiquitous phenomenon 在 the heart of human practices world wide, with direct neural 相关s (if you think that is important) that we would do well to have some science of. A Cartesian science of the 心神 will blind us, if we insist it is the only account.

But 我不 't need that kind of consideration when talking 关于 sound localization in the barn owl, and I am not moving into your turf there. I am asking that we recognize the plurality of approaches, without the kind of blanket dismissal that this discussion so often engenders. (Part 2 of 2)

戴维·波佩尔说过...

Geeesh ...我以为我对认知科学相当熟悉,但是这里提出的问题远远超出了我的理解范围。底线信息真的是我们应该持开放态度并在方法论上是多元化的吗?来吧 ...

I would welcome an analysis of how joint speech, say, informs what we can/might/should know 关于 the 心神 and brain (since the sound localization issue didn'拿走)。例如,我对词法访问感兴趣,而我'd like to know more 关于 how the processes underpinning that well-defined phenomenon (I naively assume it is uncontroversial that we access some stored entries in our head) can be illuminated more thoughtfully in the approach that is being advocated here.

I am, for the record, open to 体现的 findings/interpretations, insofar as they can be shown to be coherent and have causal force in the question of interest. (See, say, Lewis &Poeppel,2014年,大脑& Language).

另外,推荐:一点马翁&在这些情况下,Caramazza和Gallistel所做的任何事情都是有益的。例如,我建议围绕突尼斯沙漠蚂蚁的文字导航。非常迷人,内容丰富。

安德鲁说过...

为了什么's worth, I'我基本上同意弗雷德所说的话。我认为大多数认知科学家都不会't know that 表示s and 计算s are *optional* ways of explaining behaviours and that there are 可行的 另类s being developed. I note that a lot of the comments here are good evidence for this view :)

The trouble with getting out from 计算 is two-fold. First, it'如果你不改变就很难'没有什么好东西可以改变的't good non-computational analyses of all the things people want to study. Second, you can always add a 表示al/computational gloss to 任何 mechanism. That's the power of 计算, it really is that useful. But being able to describe a 计算的 route doesn'并不意味着这就是手头的系统正在做的事情。 (一个简单的例子来说明:当我丢球时,'s motion is governed by the local dynamics but can also be described 计算的ly. The latter is handy but it'不是球在做什么。)

Sabrina and I wrote a book chapter with Eric Charles (//dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/3161129/Publications/Charles%20et%20al%20(2014)%20The%20most%20important%20thing%20neuropragmatism%20can%20do.pdf) where we just point out that the most useful thing we 体现的 types can do is provide an 另类 framework for people to do science in. I think this is important work to move forward on this issue.

未知说过...

弗雷德, I completely agree that the issues of intentionality and phenomenal experience are notoriously difficult (if not outright impossible) to account for in a 计算的 theory of the 心神. The thing is, cognitivists (by and large) know this. The question is whether there is another game in town that gives a reasonable account for these sorts of things.

Reading what you wrote, it seems to me that you are advocating for two mutually incompatible views. On the one hand that you are claiming embody cognition theorists are able to give us a coherent account of all the stuff that cognitivists care 关于 AND also solve the issues of intentionality, qualia, phenomenal experience and so on. On the other hand, you seem to advocate that the theoretical and ontological commitments of cognitivists and embody cognition theorists are so different that these two groups actually care 关于 different objects of study altogether.

Did I get the first part right? If so, would you 心神 sharing a reference or an account of what you consider a successful story that would substantiate this "体现正确的认知能力't"态度?这不是一个卑鄙的要求。如果你不这样做't reject 表示alism outright (which you don'似乎),并且您认真对待认知主义的成功故事,那么,如果您展示出一种我们也可以吃蛋糕的方法,我想每个人都会感到高兴。

但是,第二部分我理解正确吗?如果是这样,那么在我看来,您并不需要那么多争论"方法论多元化",但要研究两个最终不同的领域:认知主义者会研究"minds"作为个人具有并体现认知理论家的一种信息处理符号结构,他们避开了个人的观念"minds",以及谁试图说明有情人的主体间体验的意向性(等?)(或您认为是更好地构筑最终学习对象的任何方式),因此您明确拒绝该词"mind", 在 some point, so I think you probably have something else in 心神, no pun intended).

弗雷德说过...

>底线信息真的是我们应该持开放态度并在方法论上是多元化的吗?来吧 ...

我不 't see why this is a bad idea. If my understanding of cognitive science is so 激进ly different from yours, why would it be a bad thing to be less than 狗 matic? This exchange started with my contention that Greg was seemingly not aware of the magnitude of the disagreement, of the space of difference, between us. You say my concerns 关于 collective intentionality are beyond the scope of your understanding. I doubt that is true, but if it is, they still 代表 serious challenges for 任何 cognitive science that includes languaging in all its forms as part of its object of study.

The study of joint speech has caused me to challenge my own understanding of 心神 and brain. If you have never encountered it before, I can see being bemused, but I cannot see why it should be shoehorned into a (from my perspective) narrow view of what cognitive science is 关于.

Cognitive science is a much larger undertaking than is 代表ed here. I think that is the root of our disagreement. And in a series of comments on a blog, we'不打算解决它们。但是我坚决支持我最初提出的格雷格'该词的占用"embodied" was not well informed 关于 体现的 approaches to 心智, brains, behaviour, experience or cognition.

但是我很感谢这次交流。毫无疑问,我们的道路将一遍又一遍。 。 )。

格雷格希科克说过...

Can someone give me a single example of a non-information processing (not using the loaded term, 计算) account of a behavior? I'我以前尝试看过安德鲁的例子&萨布丽娜指出(捕蝇,板球,步行机器人),它们都涉及信息处理。如果激进的体现可以'在不诉诸信息处理的情况下解释某件事,然后's dead in the water. Unless this is just a semantic debate 关于 what counts as information processing, in which case, we should all just get back to work.

威廉·马汀说过...

@ 安德鲁: "we just point out that the most useful thing we 体现的 types can do is provide an 另类 framework for people to do science in. I think this is important work to move forward on this issue."

In theory there are always potentially other 可行的 frameworks.Developing an 另类 is certainly useful, but only compelling if there are well worked out examples that persuade us it is 可行的. Chomsky critiqued the framework of Skinner (thoroughly, I might add, unlike the 体现的 or "postcognitive"抱怨认知主义),但他同时开发了一个学习语言的框架,该框架做了一些实际的工作。

格雷格希科克说过...

也许吧's告诉我们,一些(初步)令人信服的根本性体现方式(步行或"tidying"机器人,耳朵的位置等)是相当外围的过程,接近塑造输入/输出的身体构造。但是请注意,要维护此类帐户,您需要'd只需将眼睛连在腿上-不需要大脑-在这种情况下,您得到了一个可以't do much. Sure it might tidy some blocks, but ask it to put the red block on the blue block and it will just continue 整理. Perhaps, then, the biggest challenge to 激进 embodiment is the existence of 100 billion neurons in between the environment and the body.

安德鲁说过...

In theory there are always potentially other 可行的 frameworks.Developing an 另类 is certainly useful, but only compelling if there are well worked out examples that persuade us it is 可行的.
I'我很确定我们知道这一点。成功的例子很多'radical'文献中的(非代表性)研究;琳达·史密斯(Linda Smith)和埃斯特(Esther Thelen)的广泛的a-not-b错误研究程序就是一个很好的例子。实证工作和理论框架的发展是齐头并进的。当然,还有很多工作要做,但是我们've been going 关于 40 fewer years than standard cognitive psychology!

Chomsky critiqued the framework of Skinner (thoroughly, I might add, unlike the 体现的 or "postcognitive"抱怨认知主义),但他同时开发了一个学习语言的框架,该框架做了一些实际的工作。
当然,斯金纳(Skinner)从未回应乔姆斯基(Chomsky)'s so-called 'devastating critique'因为他读了它才意识到乔姆斯基没有't understand Skinner's behaviourism. Let'只是说乔姆斯基不是'我的科学革命模型-我更喜欢James Gibson :)

威廉·马汀说过...

@ 安德鲁: 成功的例子很多'radical'文献中的(非代表性)研究
您引用的a-not-b程序不是 另类 framework; it is the exact same framework: decisively cognitive, 计算的, 表示al, with some minor quibbles over the details of what 表示s and 计算s there are. Let me quote from an article by 琳达 Smith (2006) on the matter:

"他们的方法始于对 性能, with the looking, reaching, and memory 大事记 essential to the infant’任务中的实时行为。关键行为如下:婴儿 手表 a series of 大事记, the toy being put into a hiding location and then covered with a lid. From this, the infant must formulate a 运动计划 达到并且必须 保持 这个计划超过了延迟。电机计划,在 任何 婴儿的帐户’在这项任务中的表现 在其本身,是'belief'在系统方面,对象在空间和时间上都存在。这样,可以将对象概念视为嵌入—不调解之间—感知和行动的过程。" [emphasis by Smith]

该框架否认"object concept",但请查看所有使用的术语: watching, 运动计划, memory, maintenance, 大事记, formulate. 我不 '没有看到这与标准的认知主义框架有什么不同,除了它否认对象概念(但它没有'不要否认世界被解析为所谓的事物"events", the infant has "motor plans", "watches" 大事记, etc. If this is the best a "postcognitivist"可以拿出一个"alternative"做法,这是非常令人失望的。格雷格是对的"under the hood" these approaches are identical to the 计算的 approach.

Smith,L.B.(2006年)。运动很重要:Esther Thelen的贡献。生物理论,1(1),87-89。

安德鲁说过...

But 琳达 (and especially Esther) never implemented those processes 计算的ly in the brain. Their entire approach is dynamics. Any processes are implemented as the operation of calibrated dynamical systems, which is not a 计算的 process (although it is one you can describe 计算的ly, or 在 least mathematically).

您实质上是在证明弗雷德's point again: reading everything as if it were 计算的, as if that were the only way to implement these processes. It's not.

琳达's not the most 'radical' psychologist I know. But Esther sure as hell was and between them they were way more 体现的 and dynamical than 计算的 and 表示al. The a-not-b analysis is 关于 showing how a behaviour previously explained with a putative 表示 is actually best explained by the 体现的 action of the a reaching infant. This 'replacement' strategy is the essence of the 激进 approach.