2012年11月9日,星期五

是什么"认知的 "对你意味着什么?

Just curious... what counts as "认知的 " to you? I've been reading a bit of the embodied 认识 literature and I find statements like this rather odd:  "the traditional conceptualization of 认识 as a stage in the 知觉–cognition–action pipeline."  Is 认识 just high-level stuff?  我不这样认为。 Perception is 认识.  Action is 认识.  Language is 认识.  Categorization, memory, 在 tention, are all 认识.  Is this "认知三明治" notion just a straw man given modern conceptualization of 认识?

19条评论:

地龙 说过...

For me, 认识 is everything between brain and behaviour.

匿名 said...

What is a reflex? Is it a 认知的 process or just one subjected to“生态物理学的硬定律”. Is the jaw jerk reflex 认知的 ?一世s the behaviour of, say, the earthworm 认知的 ? And what about the “nano-intentional” behaviour of cells? Is it possible to draw a clear-cut context-free definition of 认识 在 all?

奇怪的循环 说过...

更换"perception" with "sensation" and it makes some more sense to me (as a 认知的 psychologist), 在 least if we simplify 感觉 to the mere activation/transduction of peripheral receptors. But I can see how separating the 行动 component is also problematic, even if we want to define "action"作为外围电机输出。显然传出的信号是'只是单向输出,而是参与了一个令人印象深刻的快速过程,该过程涉及大量反馈(除了期望,自传,与其他感官,经验等的相互作用之外)。

我认为拥有一个相当包容,宽泛的标签更有意义"cognition"/"cognitive", and then break it down into various [non-independent] components when useful. So we can talk about memory as one 认知的 process, 知觉 as another, motor control as another -- in fact, this is how most 认识 texts work, right? And we can still recognize that they are interconnected, and that a more complete picture is a more complicated one, where all aspects of 认识 dynamically affect each other in smaller or larger ways.

帕克 说过...

I define 认识, or 认知的 行动s, as the activation of reliable neural patterns that do not immediately generate motor output.

(例如:精神旋转,增加工作记忆中的数字,秘密的视觉注意力转移以及将实体复数化。)

Furthermore, 认识 (cognitive 行动s) can also be delayed in time from a triggering perceptual input, or abstracted from it.

未知 说过...

你在读谁有嵌齿的哲学。营地和基本的神经生理学营地。这正是我工作的领域-电生理学,人类。高水平的感知等同于高水平的认知过程-例如考虑图像。知觉还可以用作外部输入,更好地表述为感觉,因为它们是低水平的输入,而高水平的知觉-认知过程涉及在较高水平上处理的直接戒律,并且也是非体验式的,意识无法获得。高级感知表示是图像的一部分,可以导致动作或回到感知过程,这些过程被认为是高级认知,例如视觉成像。
Embodied 认识 from the philosophical side has way to many variants on the same theme.

格雷格希科克 说过...

I'我一直在阅读Barsalou和相关的理论家。因此,似乎我们混合了以下定义"cognitive" with some restricting it to higher-level processes and others happy to have 认识 involving lower level stuff.

A couple questions that come to my 心神 in light of some of the comments above.

Is there a meaningful distinction between 知觉 and 感觉? (I don't think so)

For those of you who believe 认识 is restricted to higher level processes, how do you decide the boundary point between 认识 and non-cognitive mental operations? I would challenge you to come up with a definition that is non-arbitrary.

My ultimate point of this discussion: if we get the definition of 认识 right, "embodied 认识"是一个毫无意义的概念。

有什么想法吗?

马蒂姆 said...

这正是镜子神经病社区的问题。他们说:"Actions can be understood by mirroring, without any 认知的 processes"。这显然是荒谬的。

But this view is apparently shared by some commentators. It seems like there is a direct route from the very earliest visual level to the lowest motor output level. And 行动s are understood by activating this motor output level. Hmm, this doesn't make sense. Even if this logic is true I would expect some backflow from the lowest motor level to levels were 行动s are planned, let's say a goal level (which then enables 行动 understanding). I cannot see why this is not 认识?

I agree that the concept of embodied 认识 has a problem here, because you need a sharp boundary. Otherwise you have to state that brain IS your body, and therefore everything in the brain is embodied. I can live with that.

亨里克 said...

帕克说...
I define 认识, or 认知的 行动s, as the activation of reliable neural patterns that do not immediately generate motor output.


I'd strongly disagree. Let me phrase it the other way round: Is neural activity necessary for something to be 认知的 ? (What about machines? Is a Turing machine a 认知的 device? Does a speaking and acting 机器人 exhibit something like 认识?) This brings me to Greg's point:


Is there a meaningful distinction between 知觉 and 感觉? (I don't think so)


I am sure that a 机器人 will not FEEL/SENSE something we call heat or coldness. However, the 机器人 is able to PERCEIVE the temperature in that it may change its behaviour and avoid a dangerous heat source.

我想提出的是心理表征和信息处理的思想。术语'cognition'因此,可以将其定义为类似于对心理表示的信息过程的操作。


匿名马蒂姆说...
I agree that the concept of embodied 认识 has a problem here, because you need a sharp boundary. Otherwise you have to state that brain IS your body, and therefore everything in the brain is embodied.


当然啦'大脑不是您的(整个)身体。但它's an integral part of it. What people in the embodiment section are claiming is that 认识 wouldn't work the way it works without the rest of your body since your 心神 (!) is embodied.

格雷格希科克 说过...

我认为,亨里克(Henrik)提出了我最初提出的问题的主要问题和最终要点。认知是一个坏词。对于不同的人来说,这意味着不同的事情。有人将其视为仅是高级心理功能,有人将其视为大脑所做的一切。

我们需要谈论的是表示和计算。从这个角度来看,"cognitive 三明治" (perception --> 认识 --> 行动) that so many embodied theorists are throwing around becomes vacuous as best and misleading 在 worst because there is nothing to 三明治; it'只是表示和计算。摆脱误导性术语,我们留给"embodied 计算"这基本上意味着感觉和运动系统执行复杂的计算。我们已经知道了。

亨里克 said...

格雷格,您能举个例子说明一些理论家如何抛弃'cognitive 三明治'? I'm not sure if I got your point. Solely because it seems to be all about 计算 and representation, this does not imply that 知觉, 认识 and 行动 are the same.

I just had a look into the literature and came across an interesting and even more confusing answer to what 认识 is:

"行动:带来世界的结构耦合历史。"(瓦雷拉(Varela),汤普森(Thompson),罗什(Rosch)1991年:第206页)

ew!关于计算,甚至有人认为"最好通过非计算性和非代表性的思想来研究认知[...]" (Clark, 1997: 148).

格雷格,如果你这么说

Perception is 认识. Action is 认识. Language is 认识. Categorization, memory, 在 tention, are all 认识.

What do these have in common? 可能 be that might give us an answer to what 认识 might be.

格雷格希科克 说过...

"The first and foremost challenge is that 认识 cannot be studied as a module independent from other modules (sensory and motor), as suggested by the “cognitive 三明治” metaphor. Instead, 认识 is deeply interrelated with sensorimotor 行动 and affect."

-Pezzulo,G。等。 (2011)。实施例的机制:有关实施例和计算模型的对话。 Psychol正面,2,5。

"The classical 三明治 conception of the 心神 – widespread across philosophy and empirical sciences of the 心神 – regards 知觉 as input from world to 心神, 行动 as output from 心神 to world, and 认识 as 三明治ed between."

-Hurley, S. (2008). The shared circuits model (SCM): how control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation, deliberation, and 心神reading. Behav Brain Sci, 31, 1-22; discussion 22-58.

"I am skeptical of the Classical Sandwich myself, because I believe that thinking incorporates representations used for 知觉 and motor control"

-王子(即将出版)体现意识吗?在体育罗宾斯和。 M. Aydede(编),《剑桥情境认知手册》。

"traditional psycholinguistics also assumes the 认知三明治, with the thinking “meat”分开生产和理解“bread.” But if 行动 and 知觉 are interwoven, then production and comprehension are interwoven as well, and so accounts of language processing should also reject the 认知三明治."

皮克和加罗德(即将出版)。语言产生和理解的综合理论。行为与脑科学(目标文章)。


What do 知觉, 行动, and "cognition"有共同点?计算。

匿名 said...

If I am not mistaken, the (pejorative) metaphor of the classical 认知三明治 model comes from the radical embodied cognitivists who reject both representations and 计算. For them, 认识 is a kind of Watts governor, 知觉 and 行动 in one, with nothing much noteworthy in between. A poor 三明治!
维莱姆

匿名 said...

"robot'可能是一种有用的方式来处理我们的概念化'cognition'. The reason being that a 机器人 can only perceive or sense temperature if it has some sort of thermal sensor, in that case the distinction of hardware versus software becomes clear(of course for some embedded controllers the sw/hw distinctiion can become blurred). Similarly the 机器人 only effects behavior through some sort of actuator or connection to a mechanical system, Thus 认识 has to do with software, i.e., the program doing the processing, everything else is either a sensor or an actuator. For our human wetware the distinction is much more fuzzy. We have not too much problem with the boundary of sensor/actuator 在 hair cells/muscle. We might imagine reflexes as non-cognitive, i.e. a very short number of synapses between hot and move your hand. Anything that takes more synapses is then 认知的 . -RC

格雷格希科克 说过...

为什么可以't a reflex be "cognitive"?反射是一种计算形式吗?一个神经元池的输入是否导致另一神经元池在反射回路中激发?这与PPC中导致另一个神经元激发的PPC中的神经元池有根本区别吗?

匿名 said...

To go on with the stupid examples in the second comment below the post (which I neglected to sign): If a plant turns to the sun, is it 认识? A crude definition of 认识 could be processes that can’不能归结为物理或生物学。然后也许是巴甫洛夫’s dog salivation could be 认知的 while the jaw jerk reflex not. 维莱姆

格雷格希科克 说过...

认知只是一个坏词。在我看来,这令人困惑。

弗雷德 说过...

我不't know that "computation"让我们处于更好的状态,真的...参见,例如点5

http://www.ageofsignificance.org/

(this is Brian Cantwell-Smith's [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brian_Cantwell_Smith] new/ongoing take on what 计算 is)

瑞安·奥吉维(Ryan Ogilvie) 说过...

传统上,该术语'cognition'被哲学家用来指思想和知识。尽管像笛卡尔,休ume和康德这样的人物可以被认为是原始认知科学家,但他们没有'真正使用该术语来指代思想的物理基础。 (在笛卡尔的情况下,尤其如此,因为他是持卡的二元论者。但是思考如何在物理事物中实例化思维仍然是一个难题。)后来随着计算主义的兴起而来。

The embodied 认识 folks are worried about what was once a dominant way of conceptualizing thought in the mid 20th century, namely, as a central processor that received inputs from sensory apparatus and delivered outputs to motor systems. Sensory input was taken to be a complicated transduction story, while 行动 output was just a complicated effector story--hence, the "sandwich" metaphor.

If one thinks that there is perceptual processing is essential in someway to thought (e.g., beliefs, judgments, desires, etc.), then you will want to reject the 三明治 model of 认识. In other words, 我不't think we'在这里,与一个稻草人打交道,因为这是一个实质性的问题。

However, you might reject the notion that perceptual processing (or motor output) is essential to thought, yet nonetheless think of sensory processing as 认识. In such as case, one just needs to be clear about how she or he is using the term.

So, yes, the use of 认识 in contemporary and historical debates does introduce significant confusion. I guess we just have to carefully work our way through the mess.

干杯,

瑞安



格雷格希科克 说过...

我的问题是,具体的人指的是"*心灵*的经典三明治模型"实际上,三明治模型仅适用于某些领域,尤其是概念知识的表示。除非您希望限制,否则将体现作为心智的替代模型是一个稻草人"mind" or "cognition"仅包括概念性表示或问题解决等。

电机控制文献中的状态反馈控制模型是否应该在模型之外?"mind"?是视觉计算"infer"运动的结构不属于运动的一部分"mind"?

这里's a wild thought: the embodied 认识 movement is nothing more than the realization by theorists in "high level 认识"感觉和运动系统本身就是复杂的信息处理系统,能够进行分类,得出推断,做出预测等(感觉和运动科学家已经知道了很长时间)。