2010年3月22日,星期一

Mirror neurons support action 理解 -- "from the inside"?

I think we are getting closer to 理解 what mirror neurons are doing. No longer is it claimed that mirror neurons are THE basis for "action 理解". Now, according to Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia's new review (2010), there are several non-mirror mechanisms that can accomplish this:

我们得出的结论是,尽管可以通过多种机制来了解其他人的行为...


镜像神经元还有其他作用(R&S可能更喜欢用“ 更多,但是 其他 我认为更好)

parieto-frontal机制是使个人能够“从内部”理解他人行为的唯一机制


Let me explain what "from the inside" means, or 在 least provide an alternative to whatever R&S mean by it. In my "Eight Problems" paper (Hickok, 2009) I noted that I can understand the action of saxophone playing even though I've never performed the actions associated with saxophone playing. R&S acknowledge that, indeed, I do understand the action of saxophone playing, and do so without the benefit of mirror neurons. But they suggest my 理解 is lacking something, namely that extra bit of 知识 that comes from knowing 怎么样 演奏萨克斯风所以认识一个我知道的动作 怎么样 to perform = basic action 理解 from non-mirror systems + mirror neuron-driven 知识 that hey I know 怎么样 to make MY motor system do that!

In other words, mirror neurons support the 知识 of 怎么样 to perform an action that one is observing -- that is, mirror neurons are part of the same old "怎么样" stream that vision neuroscientists, and 更多 recently auditory neuroscientists have been working on for 更多 than a decade (Milner & Goodale, 1995). The "怎么样" stream, of course, supports sensory-motor integration, or in R&S's terms, action 理解 "from the inside". This is why you see motor activation during the perception of actions that you can perform: it is sensory-motor association.

Importantly, notice that there is no magical semantic 知识 that suddenly falls from heaven when we know 怎么样 to perform an action. I can teach you a new word, mph,然后您就可以学会用声道重现它,以便随后的声音呈现 mph 将通过关联激活您的电机系统。我可以用手势语做同样的事情。在将感觉运动整体与概念结构相关联之前,它没有意义。因此,例如,我可以定义 mph (or the sign language equivalent) as 'the act of publishing on the topic of mirror neurons'. Now, the sensory-motor ensemble has meaning and you understand it, but does that mean that the meaning and the 理解 is now suddenly coded or even augmented by the sensory-motor ensemble itself? Put differently, do you now have a different 理解 of the concept, 'the act of publishing on the topic of mirror neurons' just because you have a new sensory-motor associate of the concept? No, you just know 怎么样 阐明与该概念相关的单词。

I suggest that this interpretation of "理解 from the inside" explains every mirror neuron-related observation, does so 更多 parsimoniously than Rizzolatti's account, and has 更多 empirical support from research on aphasia and apraxia.

参考文献

Hickok G (2009). Eight problems for the 镜像神经元theory of action 理解 in monkeys and humans. 认知神经科学杂志,21 (7),1292-43 PMID: 19199415

米尔纳(A.D.)和马塔莱(Goodale),麻省(1995)。行动中的视觉大脑,牛津:牛津大学出版社。

Rizzolatti,G.和Sinigaglia,C.(2010)。顶额额面镜电路的功能作用:解释和错误解释 自然评论神经科学,11 (4),264-274 DOI: 10.1038 / nrn2805

8条评论:

沙恩 said...

您似乎在这里有三个要点:

镜像神经元只是连接感知和动作的神经元集成体。

2.这些感觉运动伴'构成意义。重要的是概念结构的激活。 ("It doesn'在将感觉运动整体与概念结构相关联之前,请先发挥意义。")

3. Knowledge of 怎么样 to perform an action is not part of the conceptual system ("there is no magical semantic 知识 that suddenly falls from heaven when we know 怎么样 to perform an action")

So I think claim 3 is false. If you have never seen the colour blue, you will have a different concept of blue from someone who has. If you have never played a chord on a piano, you will have a different concept of a chord to a piano player. If I have never mphed, then I will have a different 理解 of mphing to someone that has.

但是也许您认为镜像神经元只是感觉运动同伴而没有任何意义的说法是正确的。但是,如果它们确实发挥功能作用,那么它将感知和行动联系起来。感知和动作的这种联系可能导致电机系统的激活(在某些情况下)。电机系统的激活会影响动作理解。您可能对该概念没有不同的理解'x'仅仅因为您拥有该概念的感觉运动联想,但是拥有并使用该联想的运动侧会导致与'x'。关于镜像神经元的说法可能比某些人声称的要弱,但我认为这是更合理的。

汤姆 said...

嗨,格雷格,

我真的喜欢这个主意!

我认为还需要解释为什么具有假定的现实世界目标的动作(即抓住实际物体)似乎会导致MN触发,而武断的'pantomime' gestures do not.

一种可能的解释可能是观察到的MN激活是动物体内​​运动程序强度/效率的某种函数。这将假设在整个动物中反复执行了针对现实世界动作的运动程序'与相对较短的特定于实验的训练或根本没有训练的生活所诱导的生活相比,其生活将具有更强的表现力。'how' a lot better if you'我有更多练习。

格雷格希科克说过...

关于#3的要点不是说没有't necessarily some "knowledge" encoded in the sensory-motor ensemble, but that this 知识 is restricted to information regarding HOW to perform an action not WHAT an action means.

是的,拥有一个概念的感觉运动同伴确实会增加某种知识,但是拥有如何执行动作的这种知识本身并不能告诉您演员的目标和意图,这正是里佐拉蒂所声称的。

匿名 said...

我也喜欢这个主意

I assume you have seen Celia Heye's substantial body of studies suggesting that the properties of MNs reflect sensorimotor associations rather than anything innate and and special to social cognition. http://www.ceciliaheyes.co.uk/ This includes things like the Catmur study that R&S try to dismiss. I'm not sure what Celia thinks about the functional role of MNs though.

格雷格希科克说过...

I'我很高兴你们喜欢这个主意。有趣的是,这只是我在“八个问题”论文中所阐述的内容。它没有'在那里没有引起太多关注。 Cecelia Hayes'最近的论文也是对感觉运动理论的详尽阐述。一世'我将不得不更仔细地看她的论文,以准确地了解她的主张;我敢打赌,这与我在上一篇博文中所说的非常相似。

I think what Tom said in response to my previous post is right: No one is going to abandon the action 理解 theory without a serious competitor theory. And while I did propose a competitor theory, I certainly failed to emphasize it, focusing instead on the why Rizzolatti'的理论失败了。我想这是战术上的错误。

霍华德书 said...

作为一个老人,我'我仍然试图理解''mirror neuron " phenominon. My 理解 is that when a monkey sees or hears another monkey snap open the shell of a peanut, the same neurons are activated in the watching/hearing monkey as in the monkey carrying out the 折断.

但是,这是否意味着观看/聆听的猴子一定会在参与锻炼的那些肌肉中表现出相同或相似的神经肌肉活动。 'snapping'.

现在让我跳到人类身上,这可能会对我们的能力产生影响"understanding"-在有关镜像神经元的讨论中经常使用的术语。我们指的是什么,以及如何定义"understanding"?我们是否指的是彼得·福纳吉(Peter Fonagy)和他在贝勒(Baylor)的同事所描述的心理能力?'推断他人的行为和自己的行为是未观察到的推断的心理状态(在他人和在自己中)以及其他行为的反映的能力'的精神状态可能与一种不同's own'? Without such 理解 we are 在 risk for logical thinking to regress to teleological state.

还是我们指的是移情的能力,被描述为'有能力非判断性地体验他人对自己和自己的世界以及自己/世界的有意识和前知觉的看法,而不论经验可能对我们有多远? Kohut将此称为'替代内省'学习对方'向内看的经验。

感谢您的意见。

格雷格希科克说过...

Rizzolatti没有清楚地定义理解,这是帐户的问题之一。

匿名 said...

When reading your Eight problems for the 镜像神经元theory It would have been very useful to find your opinion on what action 理解 is, that will help so much as to take advantange of the large amount of papers writen on the subject.
阿科斯塔